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Animal Encounters: Performance, Animality & Posthumanism 	
 
“Life is a domain which possesses a wealth of being-open, of which the human world may know 
nothing at all.” Heidegger in Fundamental Concepts. 
  
The question of human nature in philosophical enquiry confronts the binary opposition of human and 
animal. Nietzsche, for example, critiques the metaphysical precedence of humans as biological 
evolutionary models in relation to animals as ‘other’. The presence of the animal, further seen in the 
works of George Bataille, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari among others, simultaneously demands a 
rethinking of human and humanist subjectivity but also resituates the discourse of the subject in terms 
that identify a definite ‘other’ in the very possibility of ‘becoming-other-than-human.’ This is a 
paradox that marks a clear rupture in the classical discourse of subjectivity. On the one hand, animality 
profoundly enacts posthumanist, non-anthropocentric perspectives, but on the other, it restates 
humanist conceptions conceived on the human-animal binary. 
  
The aim of this interim event is to explore how performance challenges the dimension of human 
subjectivity in its encounter with animals and animality. From the baiting of bears in Elizabethan 
theatre to the inclusion of ‘attack’ dogs on stage in the recent work of Romeo Castellucci, animals have 
existed in a tense and often antagonistic relation to performance, performers and the theatre. They have 
served as a cipher for the very limits of performance and as a reminder that theatre’s history is bound to 
a human history of cruelty. More recently, performance has pointed a spotlight on broad issues of 
human-animal relations and has offered a space for greater affinities and relations. We are interested in 
thinking about the paradox of the animal in performance in relation to human, posthumanism, and the 
‘being-open’ to possibilities in the future. 
  
We invite explorations that might explore such themes as: 
  
• The performativity of animality as ways of perceiving, defining, and reinstating ‘otherness’ 
• Animal performance and neoliberalism: Animal, human and the state of exception 
• The animal politics in performance and representation 
• ‘Becoming Animal’ and the political ‘other’ 
• States of affect: acts of violence or pleasure in animal performance 
• Performing animal ethics: ecological, economic, and environmental practices in performance 
  
We invite proposals (300 words) for 20 minute presentations from researchers and artists who would 
like to participate in this event. The aim is to focus not only on delivering short, pre-prepared 
interventions/ provocations/ papers but also to address the themes of the meeting through on-going 
discussion and debate.   
  
Please note: You need to be an existing member of TaPRA to present or attend. If you are not, you can 
become a member at the cost of £10. Registrations will open by the end of March and you can register 

















Neither Light nor Language 
This paper takes the context of responding to the film, Dark Light (2014) by Maria O’Connor, as a 
provocation to engage with aspects of the work of Jacques Derrida on the animal and the human. Dark 
Light develops as an essay film that references a series of philosophers, establishing how various 
philosophical frameworks have questioned the boundary that separates the human animal from its 
others. However, Dark Light complicates this register of presentation of philosophical positions in three 
ways. It does so in a disrupting of cinematic conventions with respect to languages and their translations. 
It also presents an enigmatic visual score whose resonance with a voice-track is allusive and open. 
Thirdly, it grounds its ethics on a question of sexual difference, as if sexual difference primordially opens 
our concerns with animal ethics.  Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign, precisely an encounter with 
philosophers concerning the separation of the human and the animal, itself opens with a tracing of sexual 
difference. The paper initially engages two tropes developed by Derrida, one concerning anthropos as a 
mediating of the divine and the bestial.  The other concerns a differentiation between the notions of 
feigning and feigning one’s feign, as if this difference is that which separates the animal and the human. 
The paper aims to ask how one encounters Dark Light as phenomenon, how it might be considered 
otherwise than as a reification, a thing or object of encounter, as de-vivified representation. Perhaps, 
obscurely, we ask how life living becomes the radical agency of the film’s encounter. 
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Neither Light nor Language 
 
He says, there, right at the beginning, they—we—are going at each other. They—we—are 
making a scene. Making a scene. He says “stealthy as a wolf.” He repeats that phrase … 
stealthy as a wolf. And in doing so, he asks what it might mean to commence, to begin a 
Seminar, a lecture, with that phrase, as if one is to make a scene, as stealthy as a wolf. So 
begins Jacques Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign, an (almost) final lecture course by 
Derrida on what I imagine to be our concern today. If it is the ‘human’ who appears to be in 
his sights, it is sexual difference that will have become his question: the la and the le of 
sexual difference, the beast, la bête, and the sovereign, le souverain. They are at each other; 
they are making a scene, this beast and this sovereign. From the wealth this seminar affords 
us, I want to excerpt just two small themes in order to introduce a short commentary on Maria 
O’Connor’s essay-film, Dark Light. One concerns what stealth would always already employ, 
necessarily and contingently, at a moment where we precisely would not be able to tell 
necessity from contingency, a capacity, a capability to feign, and moreover, to feign that one 
is feigning. The second is the constituting moment of the human as that being which 
intervenes in the theo-zoological, an anthropos that mediates between the beast and the 
sovereign. ‘Man’ is the scene that is made in a theo-zoological struggle, in their going at each 
other. When we begin to think these two themes together, supposing we are able to think 
them at all, a question arises concerning the fundamental locale of the human as that being 
caught between an undecidability of a feign, or to feign, of feigning, simulating the 
phantasms of appearance, and of feigning that feigning, as if there is a grounding locale 
precisely of the human as that animal who doubles its own dissimulations and thereby thinks 
its divinity. That dissimulation is a becoming-contract between humans that precisely 
excludes from its contractual bonds the beast and the sovereign, the la and the le of sexual 
differences, as if the human is itself-alone self-legislating. At stake, then, is performativity—
precisely making scenes of sexual differences—that I would name life-as-differentiator.  
 
Derrida finds that philosophers eventually get around to requiring differentiation of the 
human and the animal: “For Heidegger as for Lacan and so many others, the point at that time 
was to lay a new fundamental anthropology and to reply to and for the question “What is 
man?” This moment has not at all been left behind, it is even putting forward new forms of 
the same danger” (171). Jacques Lacan is the one who suggests that while animals feign, only 
humans are able to feign that they are feigning. This becomes a question of light and 
language, seeing and saying: an animal cannot be a subject, which is to say a relation of one 
signifier to another, a subject of the signifier, and hence constituted in the Symbolic, in the 
locus of the Other. Animals have no unconscious. Their relations to otherness are specular, 
which is to say, confined to the Mirror Stage, as instinctual behaviour, especially in 
sexualizing specularity. But this specularity would never be the constituent of the Gaze, 
concerned as the latter is with the insistence of the letter in the unconscious, desire and 
demand. In short, the animal reacts instinctually, while the human responds, which is to say, 
as subject to the locus of the Other, to Law and transgression, the human is responsible. The 
animal is neither responsible nor irresponsible. The question of right, law and the good do not 
arise for it. This would be Lacan’s position that would as well be proximate to Heidegger’s. 
Derrida deconstructs this binary ‘reaction-response’, as if we could essentially mark their 
difference, or ground their differences. Responsibility would never be that about which we 
have categorical certainly: “Having doubts about responsibility, decision, one’s own being-
ethical, can be, or so it seems to me, and ought perhaps to remain, the indefeasible essence of 
ethics, of decision, and of responsibility.” In this sense, then, an ethics would encounter in its 
differentiations and multiplications reactings/responses whose decidability would always 
already be brought into question, as if one could essentially and each time draw a line 
between feigning, pretending as re-acting, and pretending-to-pretend, effacing traces, as re-
sponding. This difference of re-acting and re-sponding asks for another logic of decision, 
another thinking of life, living beings in their sovereignty as living self-sufficiency. Neither 
light nor language would be the stakes in this, as if we humans, in our bestial divinity have 
that vantage point from which life is clarified, seeable and sayable—totalizable.   
 
My contention is that Maria O’Connor’s film Dark Light evades all essential logics of the 
rational animal, all grounding assumptions of the speaking animal, all decisive and 
categorical thinking on the human as ethical responsibility. Its sexual differences feign, re-act 
and pretend-to-pretend, re-spond to another thinking of life, to an undecidability as to who or 
what this film is for, as if it is for no-one quite human, but yet addresses a life, singular and 
immediate. In this sense it evades a definition of light’s clarity or language’s wanting-to-say, 
intentional consciousness. Rather, in relays between visibilities and statements, it unsettles 
matter’s determinability into forms and a voice’s soundings into meanings. We follow 
neither, while yet tracing the contours of each. We seem not to know how to react nor to 
respond. And yet we are affected. It is this affect that I want to explore, this affective life 
living itself in my going along with it, that seems to me to open the semblances, re-
semblances, re-actings and re-spondings to Dark Light’s archive of sounds and images.  
 
She says—he wrote her. That’s how Dark Light commences, in more ways than one. She-he 
wrote, she was going at them. Without hesitation. She, at times, erased her traces. She does 
that, dissimulates, counterfeits all of her coins. It makes valuation chaotic, im-measureable. 
Vain, even—as if it is a question of looks. She and he make a scene that concerns the 
instability of our logics of sense, that we are irredeemably on the outside of the outside, 
abandoned to the oblivion of an existence whose sensibility we are forever awaiting. It never 
comes. All the while we have narrated the doxas of philosophical outsides, as if there is a 
passageway to there, as if there is an opening to the open as such, as if we masterfully master 
the dissimulations of life’s living without remainder—indifferently reception, conception, 
deception. All the while this building, this constructing, this writing and performing, this 
acting, re-acting and responsibility we think accedes to life, accelerates it, vivifies it. All the 
while we de-vivify, we take theoretical stances, disciplinary regions, as if life, my life, my 
living, is recoupable and re-countable. For the most part it is not. Dark Light neither says nor 
shows as if it is a thing, living or dead. It is not a thing we encounter, an object whose 
meanings encounter a subject. Its expression, its taking-notice is a making-prominent that we 
awhile it, and for the most part we have no determination of a ‘myself’ who encounters it. We 
encounter meaningfulnesses (or not) rather than a thing, expressions—meaningfulnesses from 
out of life living itself. This would be the counter-logic or counter-actualization of the film—
neither its projections nor derivations but an alerting to our a-whiling, our living-in its 
company, its accompanying, its—our—en-owning. And that would also be the contingent 








What horizon of questioning allows us  to make  sense of  the broad  theme or question of  the 









1968  conference  in  New  York  on  “Philosophy  and  Anthropology,”  the  occasion  for  Jacques 
Derrida’s “The Ends of Man,” a text that addresses initially a particularly humanist reading of 
Heidegger  in France and  then a deconstruction of  ‘belonging’ and  the  ‘proper’  in Heidegger’s 
own  thinking  that  for  Derrida  insinuates  an  essential  humanism  for  Heidegger  even  as 
anthropocentrism  is eschewed, and what Derrida would encounter as an aspect of Nietzsche 
non‐assimilable  to  Heidegger’s  thinking.  I want  to  begin  by making  reference  to  Foucault’s 
conclusion to The Order of Things, by way of introducing aspects of Nietzsche’s Will to Power and 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return of  the Same, before returning  to Foucault’s 
work of  the  late 1970s as an encounter with  the crisis of humanism and nihilism  that  takes a 
path neither strictly Nietzschean nor Heideggerian. 
 
We  are  probably  all  familiar  with  that  concluding  paragraph  of  Foucault’s Order  of  Things. 
However, I will quote from it, if only for the startling and simple expression of its prose, and the 
ease with which  it presents  the possibility of erasure of what  since  the end of  the eighteenth 
century has constituted a ground to our being: 
 
One  thing  in  any  case  is  certain: man  is neither  the  oldest nor  the most  constant 
problem  that  has  been  posed  for  human  knowledge.  Taking  a  relatively  short 
chronological  sample  within  a  restricted  geographical  area  —  European  culture 
since  the  sixteenth  century  —  one  can  be  certain  that  man  is  a  recent  invention 
within it. … As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of 
recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. 
If  those arrangements were  to disappear as  they appeared,  if some event of which 







a conference of  this  type  is of what would  that new mutation of being human be composed? 
Would technology or animality, for example, constitute another ground to the question of being 
human?  This  end would  pose  the  question  of what  new  beginning, what  other  form  of  the 
human would or could emerge. Yet we would see in such a consequential questioning precisely 
the  continuation of  the  anthropology of humanism, precisely  the prolonging of  the  figure of 
man, the restating of an anthropocentrism at the heart of a philosophical location of the human. 
And  we  would  have  overlooked,  perhaps,  what  Nietzsche  was  asking  of  thinking  and  the 














are  cocked  even now. For  some  time now, our whole European  culture has been 




Nietzsche,  the  one  who  has  passed  through  nihilism,  ‘leaving  it  behind,  outside  himself,’ 
presents a  ‘gospel of  the  future’  in The Will  to Power as a  countermovement  to nihilism yet a 
countermovement  that  necessitates  a  perfect  nihilism.  The  antimony  for  Nietzsche  was 
Christian Morality and its consequent truthfulness: appeal to the highest values as an antidote 
to  nihilism,  and  the  abrasive  and  abusive  work  of  truth  dissolving  that  knowledge  of  the 







greatest  suffering,  a  Christian  redemption  from  life,  for  a  spiritual  after‐life,  or  in  the 
dismemberment  of  Dionysus,  the  promise  of  life  (542‐543).  Eternal  recurrence  abolishes  all 
teleology, goal, progress, in the sense that if the world had a goal, it would have been reached: 
“If there were for it some unintended final state, this must also have been reached. If it were in 
any  way  capable  of  pausing  and  becoming  fixed,  of  “being,”  if  in  the  whole  course  of  its 
becoming  it possessed even for a moment this capability of “being,” then all becoming would 
long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all “spirit.” (546). Without will, there is 







interrupted at times by the commencement of war. The  lectures were published  in German  in 
1961 in four sections and translated to English in four volumes between 1979 and 1984: The Will 
to Power as Art; The Eternal Recurrence of the Same; The Will to Power as Knowledge and as 
Metaphysics;  and Nihilism. Heidegger will  always be guided  in his  reading of Nietzsche by 
Nietzsche’s  overturning  of  Platonism  undertaken  in  Twilight  of  the  Idols,  and  discussed  by 
Derrida  in  Spurs:  Nietzsche’s  Styles.  Heidegger  emphasises  that  Nietzsche  inverts  Platonism 
without twisting free from Platonic metaphysics, without escaping Platonism. In his discussion 





from  the  yes  of  will  to  power.  It  directly  concerns  the  Platonic,  Christian‐moral 
interpretation  of  the  world  in  all  its  overt  and  covert  transformations.  Thinking 







his  question  of  the  essence  of man, Nietzsche will  continue  to  engage metaphysically  in  an 
inversion of  the rational animal with respect  to will‐to‐power,  that  is with respect  to nihilism. 
Thus  Heidegger  emphasises  that  with  metaphysics,  thought  is  the  enabling  perceiving  as 
representation of what comes to presence as the being of what is. In the modern age, the ground 
of this representing is certitude, perceiving as  judging correct, “tribunal that decides about the 
beingness of beings.”  (219)  In  this sense, reason becomes  the absolute, culminating  in Hegel’s 












But  the  awakened  and knowing  say:  I  am  body  entirely,  and nothing  else;  soul  is 
merely a word for something about the body. The body is a great reason, a plurality 
with one meaning, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd. An instrument of your 
body  is  also  your  little  reason,  my  brother,  which  you  call  “spirit”  —  a  little 
instrument and toy of your great reason. (218) 
 
We  thus  recognise  in Heidegger’s  reading  of Nietzsche’s  nihilism  as will  to  power,  that  the 
modern age presents, in Nietzsche’s diagnosis, as a fundamental inversion of prior metaphysics, 
wherein  rationality  as  the  absolute  power  of  understanding  is  transposed  to  animality  as 
bodying will to power: “Body  is the name for that configuration of will to power  in which the 





















remember  the  difficulty  the  being  as  a  whole  of  Da‐sein  presented  in  Being  and  Time, 
necessitating the thinking of being‐for‐death as its disclosed moment. The question of being as a 




and  the  dead:  “Our whole world  is  the  ashes  of  countless  living  creatures:  and  even  if  the 
animate  seems  so  miniscule  in  comparison  to  the  whole,  it  is  nonetheless  the  case  that 
everything has already been transposed into life — and so it goes.” (84) (As an aside, it would 
be useful  to give some considered  thinking  to an essential  relation of Nietzsche  to Heidegger 
here on Heidegger’s being‐for‐death.) The pervasive character of  the world  is  force, not  to be 
equated  or  subsumed  under  force  understood  as  calculative  in  physics  or  as  dynamics,  but 
precisely  as  will‐to‐power  as  the  disclosure  in  nihilism  as  the  being  of  beings.  Force  is  not 
infinite  but  limited. Thus  the  totality  of  the world  is  finite,  hence  the  finitude  of  being  as  a 











This  exclusion  from  the beginning  is  the precautionary measure  to  avoid  the  introduction of 
anthropomorphism, a defence against  the  ‘humanization’ of being. For Nietzsche,  there  is no 




the  supreme  ‘humanization’  of  beings.  If  ‘chaos’  is  the  ab  initio  warding  of  all 
anthropomorphisms of beings, all we can say is nothing. This nothing, Heidegger suggests may 
well be  the most human of humanizations  in which we catch sight of  the  task of determining 
being  as  a  whole.  For  Nietzsche,  necessity  is  the  trait  or  trace  of  chaos.  How  would  this 
dehumanization  of  being  yet  be  a  supreme  humanization?  Heidegger  explores  this  via  the 
Doctrine of The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. ‘Man’ is decisively and solely that collision of the 
future  and  the  past  that  affront  one  another  in  the  Moment.  Heidegger  digs  to  a  more 
primordial questioning:  initially  the question “what  is man?” which he suggests has yet  to be 
essentially  thought outside of metaphysics’ history of  the  rational animal and  its more  recent 
inversions,  whose  engagements  with  technology  or  humanized  technologies  continue  to 
obscure  the  essential nature of  the question. But he will go  further and  suggest  the question 















neatly or  in a summary fashion be so simply read. It  is significant  that  in his College de France 
lectures  of  1977‐78  he  provides  an  important  corrective  or  further  resolution  to  the 
understanding  he  gained  in  his  research  for  The Order  of  Things.  He  suggests  that  his  later 
research on  the  emergence of “population” as a new  entity on  the horizon of understanding 
humanity at the end of the eighteenth century, allowed him to recognise the extent to which the 
emergence of  the  forms of knowing and  techniques  for control of populations constituted  the 
grounds  for  the  emergence  of  the  modern  episteme  in  labour,  life  and  language.  Foucault 
suggests: “The population  is not conceived as a collection of  subjects of  right, nor as a  set of 
hands making up the workforce; it is analysed as a set of elements that, on the one hand, form 
part of the general system of living beings (the population then falls under “the human species,” 
which was a new notion at  the  time,  to be distinguished  from “mankind”) and, on  the other 
hand, may provide a hold for concerted interventions ….” (S.T.P. 366). Perhaps it is the case that 
our own concerted efforts to think and rethink this subject of right was long ago overtaken by 




may want  to  shift  our  horizons  from  asking  if man  is  the  animal who  got  bored  or whose 
disclosure of  temporality  is ecstatically  technological. Rather we might ask  if  the necessity of 
this species would have ever coincided with a question of being.  
 
  
 
	
